diation as a series of analytic steps (as outlined above) is that it
permits one to recognize that there is more than one way by which
an overall moderated treatment effect might be produced. We
discuss these alternatives in the later section where we outline the
analytic approach to mediated moderation.
Moderated mediation happens if the mediating process that is
responsible for producing the effect of the treatment on the out-
come depends on the value of a moderator variable. In other
words, if the moderator is an individual difference variable, then it
would mean that the mediating process that intervenes between the
treatment and the outcome is different for people who differ on
that individual difference. If the moderator is a contextual variable,
then it would mean that the mediating process varies as a function
of context. Note that this definition importantly implies mediation
(at least for some people or in some contexts), as we defined it
previously, but it does not imply any overall moderation of the
treatment effect. And in fact, we will see that it is most convenient
to clearly define moderated mediation in the prototypic case where
there is no moderation of the X to Y effect. What varies as a
function of the moderator is not the magnitude of the overall
treatment effect on the outcome but the mediating process that
produces it. Again, moderated mediation can happen in a number
of different ways. We describe these in the section below where we
discuss analytic models.
We now turn to illustrations of both mediated moderation and
moderated mediation. These examples were chosen from existing
social psychological research but they were constructed in such a
way to illustrate both processes in prototypic cases. As such, they
are reasonable models that might be examined in social psycho-
logical research, but they are deliberate oversimplifications.
To illustrate mediated moderation, consider recent work by
Smeesters, Warlop, Van Avermaet, Corneille and Yzerbyt (2003)
on the role of “morality” versus “might” primes on cooperative
versus competitive behavior in a prisoner’s dilemma choice sce-
nario. They argued that participant’s social value orientation (pro-
self vs. prosocial) would moderate the impact of such primes.
Specifically, they showed that for participants who were more
prosocial, the primes affected the choice of cooperative versus
competitive behaviors (“morality” primes increased cooperation,
compared to “might” primes) whereas for more proself partici-
pants, this difference was not found. Their explanation for the
mediating process underlying this overall moderation was that the
primes produce expectations about how the partner in the prison-
er’s dilemma game would behave. The “morality” prime induced
expectations that the partner would cooperate; the “might” prime
induced expectations that the partner would compete. And the
researchers reasoned that these primed expectations would then be
acted upon differently by prosocial and proself participants. Those
who are more prosocial should attempt to match their behavior to
what they expect from the partner: if they expect competition, their
choice should be competitive; if they expect cooperation, their
choice should be cooperative. But among more proself partici-
pants, competitive choices should predominate regardless of the
expectations: if they expect competition, their choice should be
competition; and if they expect cooperation, they should also
compete in an attempt to exploit their partner’s cooperative choice.
In sum, the researchers anticipated that the effect of the prime on
behavioral choice would depend on whether participants were
prosocial or proself (overall moderation of the treatment effect).
And they further predicted that this moderation would be mediated
by expectations about the partner’s behavior. Primes would induce
expectations about partner’s behavior, that they would either co-
operate or compete, and participants who were prosocial would
match their own behavior to their partner’s whereas those who
were more proself would compete regardless of their expectation.
To illustrate moderated mediation, we draw on research by
Petty, Schumann, Richman, and Strathman (1993) that examined
the role of positive mood in persuasion. They manipulated partic-
ipants’ mood (either positive mood or no mood induction) and
subsequently exposed them to counterattitudinal persuasive infor-
mation. They predicted that those in a positive mood would show
more persuasion than those in the control condition. And overall
they found this treatment effect. But they further were interested in
understanding differences in what mediates this overall treatment
effect as a function of a “need for cognition” individual difference
variable. They argued that for those high in need for cognition, the
mediating process producing more persuasion as a result of a
positive mood would be one where the mood causes people to
generate more positively valenced thoughts in response to the
persuasive communication and then these thoughts in turn produce
greater persuasion. on the other hand, they argued that for those
participants who were low in need for cognition, the mediating
process would not be through positively valenced thoughts. In
other words, positive thoughts would mediate the mood—persua-
sion effect for those high in need for cognition, while for those low
in need for cognition the same mood—persuasion effect would not
be mediated by positive thoughts (or would be mediated by them
less). This illustrates moderated mediation: a treatment effect is
mediated differently as a function of some moderator variable.
Need for cognition moderates the way in which the mood—persua-
sion effect is produced. Note that there is no overall moderation here:
it is not the case that the mood—persuasion effect is larger or smaller
for those who differ in need for cognition. Rather the mediating
process for the same effect was hypothesized to be different.